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A B S T R A C T
This paper reports on the current state of Demand Side Response (DSR) in the UK – an early adoptor amongst
advanced economies – and the role of the end user in determining its future. Through 21 expert interviews we
establish the current state of DSR, and expectations for its development. Whilst non-domestic DSR appears
healthy, if fragile, domestic DSR is considered to be currently unviable, it's future success dependant on market
innovations. In following how that situation is expected to change, we highlight key assumptions about pro-
spective end users. These assumptions are shaping the eﬀorts of the industry actors tasked with delivering DSR.
We identify two visions of the user, one passive whilst technologies automate on their behalf, the other in-
tegrated to the point of themselves being an automaton. We detail a series of concerns about the limitations of
these user visions, and the ability of industry to reach beyond them towards a more diﬀerentiated view. We
conclude with a call to broaden the institutional landscape tasked with delivering DSR, in order to foster a
greater diversity of end user roles, and ultimately greater demand responsiveness from a broader user base.
1. Introduction
In order to mitigate the threat of climate change, states are seeking
to drastically reduce carbon emissions from their energy systems. Many
are transitioning towards low carbon, renewable energy sources. The
growth of renewable generation with ﬂuctuating output complicates
the fundamental operating requirement of electricity grids to constantly
balance supply and demand. Even without such energy sources, this
balancing requirement results in ongoing ineﬃciencies for generation
and transmission because it means coping with the ‘peaky’ demand
proﬁles that societies generate through the mass organisation of activity
(e.g. the ‘9–5 working day’) (Grünewald and Torriti, 2013). These
ﬂuctuations in both supply and demand create a strong case for the kind
of ﬂexibility Demand Side Response (DSR) promises. Domestic DSR is
also positioned as a powerful tool for addressing energy poverty
(Koirala et al., 2016).
DSR seeks to shift or reduce energy demand, both domestic and non-
domestic, in response to excess or restricted availabilities of energy on
the grid. This response might be in real time (i.e. automated), near real
time (for example sending a signal to users), or prospective (for ex-
ample ﬁxed Time of Use tariﬀs which discourage consumption during
high demand periods). The potential for DSR is part of the justiﬁcation
for smart meters, currently being rolled out in the UK at a cost of £11bn,
and in many other countries across the world (Sovacool et al., 2017).
Under the EU's 2030 Climate & Energy Framework (European
Commission, 2016), member states are committed to 40% cuts in
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. Notably, most key future energy
scenarios in the UK that have been developed in the past decade include
DSR (e.g. UKERC, 2013), though how DSR will actually mature is less
clear.
Key to realising DSR's promise is the end user. Traditionally, whe-
ther domestic or non-domestic, the end user has been just that – an
isolated, terminal node consuming energy as and when required to
meet their needs, which the grid is constantly managed to provide. By
contrast, DSR requires that this actor becomes an integrated, dynamic
component in the balancing of supply and demand. How the end user is
enrolled to play this part is the key uncertainty to which we turn this
paper's attention. Whilst previous research has envisaged how end users
may play a greater role in the transition to low-carbon economies,
(Foxon, 2013), and examined how end users might be expected to en-
gage and interact with DSR (Mert et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2015),
there has been little attention given to perceptions of end users held by
system builders, and the way that the expectations of end users shape
the development of DSR (Chilvers et al., 2018). We formulate this un-
certainty as a question of sociotechnical design – what are the char-
acteristics of this new user imagined by architects of DSR, and how
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amenable to technical intervention are they?
Following Akrich's (1992) notion of technological scripting, we
argue that this imagined user will ultimately be rendered concrete en-
ough to heavily inﬂuence DSR's mature form. Our study, consisting of
expert interviews, focuses on DSR within the UK but we emphasise that
similar energy system developments and debates around smart energy
futures are ongoing, and relevant to, many other economies.
The paper proceeds by ﬁrst outlining existing critiques of pre-
dominant energy policy. We then report on the current state of DSR in
the UK, before focusing on how domestic DSR is expected to proceed
over the next decade, drawing out two predominant visions of the user
held by our expert interviewees. We subsequently identify three un-
derlying concerns with this picture, discuss the implications of these
observations, and put forward recommendations for ensuring that do-
mestic DSR fulﬁls its environmental and economic potential.
2. Theorising the user in energy policy
Current DSR policy initiatives have emphasised the importance of
incentivising behaviour change through dynamic pricing tariﬀs
(Faruqui et al., 2010) and engaging citizens with the need for reducing
carbon emissions (Spence et al., 2015; Whitmarsh et al., 2011),
alongside the rollout of technologies (including smart meters and in-
home energy displays) to engage citizens in ‘smarter’ energy use
(Hargreaves et al., 2010). Research suggests that public acceptance of
DSM Is likely to vary a great deal depending on the device and the way
it is operated, with particular concerns where comfort and health
standards are perceived to be threatened (Mert et al., 2008; Butler,
Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2013).
Some limited research has considered interactions around DSR. In
particular, privacy protections and data sharing have been discussed as
necessities for many forms of DSR. Whilst privacy concerns appear
limited amongst UK publics, this has been a key issue in other countries,
and in the UK, a signiﬁcant proportion of the population express un-
willingness to share energy data (Spence et al., 2015). There are also
some, predominantly economic, investigations of interactions between
DSR users indicating, for example, cooperation is possible around en-
ergy demand scheduling (Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010). We also note
that there is some evidence that oversimplistic DSR programmes may
be manipulated by consumers in order to make money (Chao and
DePillis, 2013; Chen and Kleit, 2016).
Critics have raised fundamental concerns about the predominance
of energy policy approaches that implicitly individualise the carbon
reduction problem (Shove, 2014; Strengers, 2012). These concerns
feature in Strengers’ critique (2014) in which she argues that the ‘so-
lution’ to the problem of carbon reduction is typically envisaged in
conventional policy thinking as an ‘engaged consumer’ whom she dubs
‘Resource Man’. Strengers elaborates that Resource Man is imagined to
be a responsive and rational economic agent, styled in the image of the
male engineers who design for him. He both actively monitors and
automates energy consumption, and is perfectly integrated with price
signals and the latest smart technologies, in order to ensure that the
optimally eﬃcient level of energy consumption is achieved. However,
Strengers argues that the characterisation of individualised energy use
promoted by this model grossly misrepresents the aspirations and
practical realities of most people's energy consumption by glossing over
key social dynamics and processes, that ﬁgure in the context of ev-
eryday experiential understandings of energy use.
In response, critics have called for a more contextualised view to
better account for the wider socio-cultural, organisational, and political
milieu implicated in social practices of energy consumption
(Hargreaves, 2011; Shove, 2003). Whilst variation exists in the con-
ceptualisation of ‘practices’ as a unit of analysis, they are commonly
theorised as dynamically integrated assemblages of skills, materials and
technologies, and meanings that emerge and become stabilised through
their performance until such time as the links between them are
undermined, broken, or replaced, and they subsequently die out (Shove
and Pantzar, 2005). Rather than focussing on the ‘moments’ of in-
dividual behaviour and decision making, this more holistic approach
attends to wider considerations including how practices operate and
change, and what goals energy consumption seeks to achieve (Shove
et al., 2012; Sweeney et al., 2013).
The broader policy implications of a practice theory perspective is
that demand management is complicated and qualiﬁed by the variable
social contours and trajectories of peoples’ energy use. This has led to
proposals for decentering the current emphasis on steering in-
dividualised energy consumption from the top down and repositioning
demand management in more open terms in order to eﬀectively engage
with localised and collective practices and cultures of energy con-
sumption (Chilvers and Longhurst, 2016). For example, alternative
notions of the ‘Energy Citizen’ assert the necessity of public participa-
tion in energy governance and policy-making processes at all levels,
incorporating ideas of sustainable development such as taking respon-
sibility for climate change, fairness, and promoting the welfare of
communities and future generations (Devine-Wright, 2007). Using this
frame, citizens, practitioners, and other locally-situated stakeholders
are considered to have a close understanding of how current assem-
blages of understandings, infrastructures, and practical knowledge are
reproduced through daily routines at home, in the market, and in the
workplace, and might therefore hold other key insights into how or-
ganised relations of energy consumption can be reconﬁgured to bring
about signiﬁcant cultural change (Foster et al., 2012; Stephenson et al.,
2010).
A growing number of policy programmes and local initiatives have
accordingly begun to illustrate the potentials of Energy Citizen ideals
through such means as community renewable energy projects, localised
micro energy generation, and energy co-operatives (Devine-Wright,
2007). In line with this, in 2014 the UK government published its
‘Community Energy Strategy’ (DECC, 2014) with the goal of supporting
sector development. Whilst welcoming of the Strategy's intentions,
Smith et al. (2016) have questioned whether such an approach risks
imposing a “micro-utility” (P.429) template on community energy
which ultimately hampers its eﬀectiveness at sourcing alternative so-
lutions. More recently practitioners have highlighted how simultaneous
cuts in funding support have been detrimental to the goals of the
Strategy (Community Energy England, 2017). These developments thus
raise key questions about what elements have been put in place or are
missing, and what links now need to be made, in order to overcome
current obstructions to more sustainable energy practices (Shove,
2014). Yet, despite notable shifts in discussions around the con-
ceptualisation of the user within energy demand broadly, there is little
empirical evidence on how system builders within industry and pol-
icymaking perceive the role of DSR users (Chilvers et al., 2018). Given
how key users are to achieving the vision of DSR, addressing these gaps
is imperative. This research sets out how DSR users are conceptualised
among stakeholders, and how these diﬀerent conceptualisations aﬀect
possibilities for enacting future DSR policies.
3. Methods
The study draws on 21 semi-structured expert interviews carried out
in late 2016 and early 2017. Interviews obtained the views of a range of
participants engaged in the energy sector (see Table 1). Participants
were recruited through existing contacts and snowballing, in part using
the authors’ own expert knowledge of the ﬁeld to identify suitable
participants (Littig, 2009, p. 103). The intention was to capture a
snapshot of current expectations and intentions for DSR across a diverse
range of stakeholders, and particularly the role of ‘end users’.2 Our
2 ‘End users’ is a potentially problematic term to use in describing agents who
are expected to have active roles in the functioning of the electricity grid, in its
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interest in experts’ knowledge was not as a source of ‘facts’, but rather
as indicative of their own, and their community's, eﬀorts in shaping the
future of DSR (Bogner et al., 2009). Accordingly, our experts included
both those within the domains of government and industry which are
most directly driving DSR developments, and those in the third sector
and academia who might oﬀer more critical perspectives (Meuser and
Nagel, 2009). Interviews primarily took place by Skype or phone (two
were face-to-face), lasted around one hour, and were audio recorded
before being transcribed.
A social practice theory frame, as described in Section 2, was used to
orientate our interview questions and subsequent analysis. Interview
questions elicited participant's perspectives concerning the following
issues: how participants currently conceived of energy consumption as
problematic; how they deﬁned their involvement with DSR, along with
the involvement of other respective stakeholders; their understandings
of strategies currently employed to promote DSR; their conceptions of
how energy practices are likely to change in the future; and what key
enablers to DSR practices will be required for more sustainable changes
in energy use to materialise.
All of the interviews were coded thematically in Nvivo software. A
ﬁrst round of low-level coding was used to group data with a minimum
of interpretation. Two subsequent rounds of coding drew on a practice
theory frame to distill preliminary codes into broader interpretations.
Five interviews were second-coded by another team member and over
two iterations (rounds 1 & 2) were compared with the ﬁrst researcher's
codings. Where diﬀerences were identiﬁed they were reﬂected on by
the team and implications for analysis folded back into the coding. To
help ensure the internal validity of the research ﬁndings, our inter-
pretations of the data were reported back to study participants for their
feedback and comments (Yin, 2003).
4. Current DSR in the UK
Assessing the current UK development of DSR, it should be noted
how young this ﬁeld is. Although the notion of demand side response is
not new – following capacity constraints the US began experimenting
with it in the early 2000s – it was only with the passing of the Energy
Act in 2013 that the UK grid regulator OFGEM was empowered to
launch a capacity market to spur development of demand side mea-
sures. Amongst European states, where comparisons are perhaps most
apt, the UK was a frontrunner, alongside Belgium and Switzerland
(SEDC, 2014). In 2014 the Committee on Climate Change [CCC] – the
UK's independent body monitoring progress towards future carbon
targets – ﬁrst included ‘demand response’ amongst their list of required
measures in their annual Report to Parliament (2014).
Despite its relative youth, consideration of the ﬁeld's development
needs to be set in the context of the ambition of the UK's carbon targets,
given greater impetus by record global temperatures in 2015 and 2016.
Notably, the CCC's (2017) report highlights demand response amongst
areas requiring stronger policy implementation. This is then a timely
moment to assess DSR in an advanced economy.
The cultural shift required of energy network actors by the adoption
of DSR is far from trivial. The contrast with traditional energy gen-
eration and the risks involved is here highlighted by one of the policy
makers spoken to:
people are quite risk averse in this area […] clear generation solutions
are more dependable than demand side solutions, because they are
physical assets, people understand those assets and how to pay for them
and how to turn them on. [P1]
Nevertheless, the belief that change – in the form of greater grid
ﬂexibility – is required was universally held amongst experts spoken to.
Where experts were more equivocal is on what this shift will entail.
Discussing progress on DSR developments to date, experts reported
a sharp distinction between domestic and non-domestic DSR. Whilst
there is seen to be considerable scope for further growth, non-domestic
DSR was seen to be in good health, with expansion across both industry
and larger commercial operators. For such operators, using equipment
with large but potentially ﬂexible demand (e.g. industry using heating
processes, commercial operators using refrigeration), they not only
have a clear ﬁnancial case for DSR due to the scale of their energy
consumption, but crucially through well established ‘audit cultures’
have the practical means to achieving it (Brown, 2010; Kragh-Furbo
and Walker, 2018):
they have the scale of demand available, it's concentrated, it's more
readily metered, it's settled on a half-hourly basis, they can have sub-
metering in order to analyse that demand on potentially a second by
second basis. [LI1]
This progress is seen as fragile however. A concern, articulated by
aggregators providing DSR services to commercial and industrial op-
erators, was the degree to which non-domestic DSR was reliant on both
ongoing political support, and regulatory mechanisms which currently
produce unstable market conditions. In light of the political un-
certainties around austerity and Brexit, and the recent history of UK
energy policy, which has seen the collapse of the domestic PV in-
stallation market following abrupt changes to the Feed-In Tariﬀ
scheme, the possibility of similar developments in the capacity market
was a concern. A larger threat however was perceived to be un-
certainties in how the capacity market is structured. One aggregator
suggested that volatility in prices was hampering the development of
the non-domestic DSR sector by putting oﬀ potential customers:
What happened with a lot of customers actually in Britain that we met is
they […] lost conﬁdence in the whole area of the demand side, they said
“actually I did that before and I got six months out of it and then it wasn’t
worth my while after that.” It was very hard for us to talk to the customer
and say well we can guarantee you this grid price forever, when for
example we’ve already seen a drop oﬀ in price in our particular service
and frequency response, and that was purely down to the market putting
in things like diesel and stuﬀ into the service that we were delivering.
[SME1]
This tension was recognised by policy makers, who in ceding control
to market forces have experienced their own thwarted intentions for the
capacity market – previous iterations of the capacity market auctions
inadvertently encouraged the growth of highly polluting diesel gen-
eration as the cheapest solution for load balancing. That means of
curtailing the incentives for diesel are now being sought reminds us that
the market is ultimately a political artefact (Davies, 2014), but under
the neoliberal model of governance practiced in the UK, such direct
political intervention is largely reactive, and not able nor intended to
prevent short-term instability. Nevertheless, our interviews indicated
Table 1
Breakdown of participants by sector role.
Subsector [tag] Count
Policy [P] 5
Large industry [LI] 3
SME industry [SME] 3
Academic [A] 4
Third sector [TS] 6
(footnote continued)
implication that they come at the ‘end’ of the process. The use of the term here
is a deliberate choice to reﬂect the imaginaries of the designers of this process,
as described in this paper. As we shall see, there is a clear tension between
proposed active and passive roles.
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that the perceived beneﬁts of a market-led approach (which we return
to below) were such that it remains the preferred approach amongst
Westminster 3 policy makers:
[T]here has been a view from some quarters of the industry that the
system requires system architects in charge of it. That's not where we are
– the players involved are all pretty committed to the market. The thing
with the market is that it could overshoot, it could go oﬀ in unpredictable
directions – we’ve seen that with DSR and the unintended growth of new
diesel generation, that the market came up with. So there is an interesting
aspect to this about how you do public policy in a space where there are
unknowns from a consumer side, but also commercial actors are con-
structing their strategies and investing in things and we don’t necessarily
know what they are thinking of. [P1]
4.1. Domestic DSR
The domestic DSR [dDSR] sector in the UK is similarly characterised
by a market-led approach, but is far less advanced. Amongst experts
from all ﬁelds spoken to, domestic DSR in the UK is widely seen as
being unviable for the time being. As with the non-domestic sector,
government is active in seeking to foster a dDSR market, but here its
current eﬀorts are of a more fundamental nature, in establishing –
through the smart meter rollout – an infrastructure to enable the sys-
tems of measurement which are a prerequisite for a market to function.
The more granular billing enabled by smart metering is seen to open up
possibilities for tracking and, ultimately, incentivising demand response
in the home. Whilst there was agreement amongst experts that smart
metering was a necessary ﬁrst step to making dDSR possible, there was
far less clarity over what subsequent steps will be. What was clear
amongst those spoken to is that the existing approach for non-domestic
DSR does not work at the domestic scale:
it can’t just be this conventional utility aggregator programmes where an
aggregator is going out knocking door-to-door and making a £200 capital
investment in that customer in order to then get demand reduction from
that customer over time. [TS1]
The size of any domestic demand response was considered simply
too small to justify the necessary investment by third parties. Similarly,
there were doubts about installing the necessary hardware in the form
of white goods to allow for automated demand response – one policy
maker who conducted preliminary modelling of this found the eco-
nomics to be currently unpersuasive. Indeed, the challenges of model-
ling dDSR appear to be an important factor in policy makers’ limited
engagement. The uncertainty contributes to a situation in which policy
makers report that dDSR is problematic for them organisationally. UK
energy policy is heavily inﬂuenced by modelling, speciﬁcally in the
form of the Dynamic Dispatch Model4 used by BEIS.5 Policy makers
spoken to reported that currently, their capacity for modelling dDSR is
very limited, due to a shortage of data, regarding both the cost of
technology, and – of particular interest here – “the behavioural side”
[P2]. Within BEIS, the uncertainty around dDSR impacts on internal
decision making as to the best means of distributing resources between
diﬀerent energy sector programmes. This challenge is particularly acute
when dDSR is evaluated alongside more “obvious and proven” [P2]
technologies. Grid-scale storage was named as an example of such a
technology, which evidences the ﬁrst quote in this section on the pre-
ference for physical assets. Storage eﬀectively works much like tradi-
tional generation, without complicating end users to factor into the
modelling. As a consequence, whilst those we spoke to are optimistic
about dDSR, it was clear that there is no consensus amongst policy
makers that dDSR is worth investing resources in beyond the smart
meter rollout. For policy makers, the necessary next step is for market
actors to ﬁll in the perceived evidence gap:
There are no inherent barriers to modelling DSR, it's just you need a
certain amount of actual commercial activity to have empirical evidence
about how things will work, and then you need models of factoring that
in. So I think it's just a work in progress. [P1]
It should be noted that devolved administrations in Wales and
Scotland oﬀer an alternative stance to the UK Government's. Both have
taken a more involved approach regarding evidence generation,
through supporting community-led, non-proﬁt energy schemes. We
return to such schemes below.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the uncertainty around how dDSR will
be achieved, only two experts questioned whether it would happen at
all, though given the non-random interview sample we cannot extra-
polate from this. From the dissenting voices, there was a suggestion that
whilst dDSR is theoretically useful in the current transitionary stage of
the grid, as renewables mature, and importantly interconnections with
other grids increase, the need for demand response may lessen – cer-
tainly where used as an irregular option to address particularly extreme
peaks, for which it might be uneconomical. One of these experts did see
value in dDSR as an ongoing technique for dissuading peak demand
through such measures as simpliﬁed time of use (TOU) tariﬀs but
questioned – echoing those above – how this might best be achieved in
practice.
One factor in dDSR's favour is industry support. Despite the un-
certainties about how it can be realised, or perhaps because of them,
there was a conviction amongst industry members spoken to that do-
mestic DSR oﬀers them considerable commercial opportunities. There is
an element of dDSR being ‘everything to everyone’ – for new entrants to
the energy supply and consumer device markets, dDSR promises to
disrupt the dominance of incumbents, allowing newcomers to target
emerging niches or diﬀerentiate themselves with novel technologies
and services. The incumbents, facing threats of energy price caps from
politicians, talk of pivoting from supply to services. Decentralisation
poses a clear threat to existing business models; in dDSR they see the
opportunity to create a virtuous circle between selling ancillary services
and extracting ever-more customer data upon which further services
might be built. Finally, for those oﬀering technology and engineering
services to customer-facing businesses large and small, dDSR promises
demand for new infrastructures, equipment, and techniques.
To conclude on the current state of DSR, across our interviewees
there was a widely held view that dDSR will become established in some
form over the next decade, and a clear interest amongst industry in the
new commercial opportunities that are expected to emerge with it. It
remains, however, little more than a vision at this moment. By contrast,
whilst still vulnerable, non-domestic DSR has an established foothold,
underpinned by a clear economic case and a pre-existing set of readily-
adaptable accounting practices. There is a debate to be had as to
whether the current market is excessively unstable, and whether a more
pronounced ‘system architect’ role might be beneﬁcial, but for this
paper's focus on end users, we turn our attention in the remainder of
this paper to dDSR. Here far more question marks remain.
5. Where is the user?
The key uncertainty around dDSR is end users: it is, currently, a
wholly technological programme driven by policy and commercial in-
terests. Technology was seen by our interviewees as enabling dDSR in
two forms. Firstly, as already noted, the smart meter rollout will,
3 “Westminister” here refers to the UK Government – being the location of the
main institutions of state – and distinguishes from the devolved administrations
– in Cardiﬀ and Edinburgh – which have partial control over Wales and
Scotland respectively.
4 Though the Dynamic Dispatch Model now covers both supply and demand,
that its name only refers to the former is another reminder of the shift entailed
by demand response.
5 The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is the UK
Government Department responsible for energy.
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through the standardised creation and transmission of measurement
data, provide the necessary infrastructure required for a market in
dDSR. Secondly, building on notions of the Internet of Things, and
particularly the ‘smart home’ vision, networked technologies will pre-
sent the means for automating or reshaping various demand response
practices within the home. These twin developments are interlinked –
smart meter data will provide much of the ‘ground truth’ upon which
automation and information feedback systems will rely, which will in
turn realise the economic potential created by the metering infra-
structure. During discussions of dDSR there was a tendency to render
the end user invisible, as can be seen in the following assessment of a
policy expert, in whose account people are sublimated to diﬀerent
forms of adopted technology:
there will be lots of innovation, and people will segment diﬀerent types of
consumer. So there will be adjustments for storage heaters, a cohort for
electric vehicle consumers or electric heat pumps, who have large loads
who need to be managed not to exacerbate critical peaks. [P1]
Present amongst this innovation discourse is the expectation that in
melding demand response with the ‘smart’ programmes of the Silicon
Valley tech sector, the successes those companies have achieved in
‘disrupting’ media, advertising, transport etcetera, will be replicated
within the energy grid:
if Apple get involved more […] it creates a platform for more things to
happen. So if things carry on as they are I don’t know how much that
smart meter data will be used, but I think I see enough interest and talk
that would suggest that more will be done. If the likes of Apple get in-
volved and they have home hubs that are able to control as well as
monitor then that will be a really interesting one. [TS2]
Further cementing the blurring of energy and smart home markets,
several experts commented that with no clear economic case currently
existing for dDSR, progress will rely on consumers adopting smart
technologies for other intentions (e.g. convenience or comfort) which
can be repurposed for energy demand response. Google's Nest ther-
mostat provides such an example. The Nest is marketed as a product
that will save consumers both money and eﬀort through automation,
but relies heavily on a premium design aesthetic which renders it at
least as much as lifestyle product as a functional utility controller. Once
adopted it creates the possibility of demand response heating and
cooling, a service it is now oﬀering in the US. A second potential route
for dDSR into the home, raised by interviewees, is as an add-on service
which could lower the high upfront capital costs of a purchase, such as
solar panels, an electric vehicle, or a heat pump.
In eﬀectively smuggling demand response into the home, in the
form of networked technologies foregrounding other services, there is
no requirement for a shift in the role of the end user. The domestic end
user has historically been a highly passive role – as we argued in pre-
vious work (Goulden et al., 2014) – and this has been by design. The
continuation of this role is seen in one industry expert's summation of
how dDSR might operate once in the home:
There's two ends to [dDSR] really, that either it needs to be completely
hidden and the end user doesn't see it, doesn’t interact with it, doesn't
know or care anything about it. It just gets the beneﬁt and they can ignore
it. Those kind of things customers like. The other option then is that you
almost turn it into a game. You provide loads of people competing against
each other, or you provide those kind of very clear, very heavily inter-
active end of things instead. [LI2]
The quote contains two strategies for enrolling the user's home as a
functioning unit in the electricity grid: automation, in which the user
remains passive, and gamiﬁcation, in which the user is motivated to
alter their practices through the application of game mechanics. Whilst
presented in this account as opposing approaches, they in fact share a
common root. As used here, gamiﬁcation consists of “impos[ing] game
elements into the lives of other people, purporting to improve their
experiences without genuine engagement or dialogue” (Woodcock and
Johnson, 2017, p. 6). As a consequence, gamiﬁcation typically does “not
aim to change the way people think, but how they behave” (Schrape, 2014,
p. 22). Eﬀectively, such forms of gameful design seek to render the user
themselves an automaton, mechanistically responding to the grid's de-
mands just as their automated technologies do.
In Strenger's (2014) discussion of Resource Man, she identiﬁes a
number of mechanisms through which the ﬁgure is enrolled in the grid.
Alongside gamiﬁcation and automation, this includes energy feedback,
TOU tariﬀs, and micro-generation (p.27). Whilst automation might at
ﬁrst glance appear extraneous given the active role Resource Man is
imagined to adopt, recall that this ﬁgure is fundamentally concerned
with optimisation, through the rational application of technology and
associated skills. In the sense that Resource Man acts as a utility “Mini-
Me” (p.26), the notion of him as automated – no more than a trans-
parent shim between grid and domestic device – is thematically con-
sistent. This blurring of engaged-user and automated-user is clearly pre-
sent in some of our experts’ talk:
Provision of information [is key], empowering people with understanding
when they might be able to use energy more eﬃciently or cheaply and
ways of delivering that information in a way that's engaging and en-
courages that behaviour to change […] and then I think gradually over
time you can bring in the technology to automate that and take some of
that load oﬀ. [LI3]
In places, this model of user leads to some fairly heroic assumptions
about the degree to which the home can be repurposed as a balancing
node subservient to the demands of the grid operator. At these extremes
Resource Man oﬀers almost limitless potential for technologically re-
constituting domestic life, as dynamically switchable as a substation
circuit breaker, and no less amenable:
A person likes to run their home in a speciﬁc way but in theory they have
some ﬂexibility, they don’t need to heat their water at the exact same
time every day, they don’t need to charge their car at the same exact
same time of the day, they don’t need to cook their dinner, they don’t
need to wash their dishes, they don’t need to wash their clothes, the
customer will buy into the ﬂexibility. [SME1]
There was also a second ﬁgure present in experts’ talk, particularly
the accounts of industry members, who oﬀers very diﬀerent char-
acteristics. The Indiﬀerent Consumer, to apply our own label, is eﬀec-
tively everything Resource Man is not – disengaged, lazy, irrational,
ignorant. These are the ﬁgures that industry cannot touch, and that
temper any expectations of what dDSR might achieve – indeed it is
barely hyperbolic to suggest this ﬁgure haunts the accounts of many
experts.
I think experience to date has shown that customers aren’t as interested
in energy as perhaps government might hope them to be in order to drive
this change really. [LI1]
The Indiﬀerent Consumer is the ghost of energy grids past. The
energy industry has, save for the very earliest days of electricity (Morus,
1998), designed for, and so encountered, a user who is insulated from
both the grid and the current it delivers, through an infrastructure
which renders electricity opaque behind walls in which wires are
buried, illegible meter bills, and power stations built in the urban
hinterlands. Their absence in Strengers’ (2014) account of smart tech-
nology design reﬂects, we suggest, the diﬀerent experiences of the tech
and energy industries, and speciﬁcally of the idealised role of the user
within it. For the tech industry and its platform capitalism (Srnicek,
2017), extracting wealth from the peer-to-peer ﬂows of ‘Web 2.0’, the
user is sovereign, both generator and consumer of the data which wa-
shes through the industry's networks, and from which they derive value.
This is an industry used to the sight of customers motivated to the point
of queuing outside stores overnight to get their hands on new devices.
The energy industry has no comparable touchstone, instead existing in
M. Goulden et al. Energy Policy 122 (2018) 176–185
180
a market which is often treated as disfunctional by policy makers for the
refusal of customers to engage with it. This is reﬂected in the Indiﬀerent
Consumer.
Recognition of the very obvious tensions between this ﬁgure and
Resource Man can be seen in the idea of customer diﬀerentiation. Several
of the experts spoken to saw the disintegration of the once monolithic
domestic end-user, which for decades in the UK has existed in one of
only two forms: Proﬁle Class 1 (standard users) and Proﬁle Class 2
(Economy 7 6 users). In its place, a fragmentation into multiple niches,
deﬁned by how willing and how able users are to respond to dDSR –
indeed this aﬀordance is the fundamental purpose of granular smart
meter data (see Fig. 1 for example of this). At the furthest extents of the
Resource Man ideal there are visions of real-time pricing signals guiding
the moment-to-moment decision-making of homeowners and/or the
technologies they have installed, as well as informing their ongoing
adoption of additional technologies and services. This group are spoken
of in our interviews as ‘early adopters’ and ‘ecos’ or ‘greens’. At the
opposite pole, the extreme end of the Indiﬀerent Consumer, whose
disengagement from the grid is so profound that in some cases they may
become classed as ‘energy vulnerable’, their sovereign consumer role
partially usurped by the state in order to protect their interests. Be-
tween them, diﬀerent forms of technology adoption and diﬀerent levels
of engagement. Some experts saw eﬀective dDSR as requiring means of
catering to various constituencies along this distribution:
you can’t push ﬂexibility on to people […] you might just ﬁnd those
options within niches, you’re not going to ﬁnd it blanket across all. [A2]
It is consumer diﬀerentiation which allows for the otherwise in-
commensurate visions of Indiﬀerent Consumer and Resource Man to
exist side by side in the imaginaries of dDSR advocates.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
The development of dDSR in the UK is, with the exception of the
devolved administrations in Wales and Scotland, largely being left to
the market to determine. Our study highlights that the market in
question is a melding of the traditional energy sector with the tech
sector. Sociotechnical perspectives have long emphasised the im-
portance of the design of the user in the creation of new sociotechnical
systems, and yet to date, the characterisation of the DSR consumer has
often been implicit, and discussed without reference to empirical evi-
dence. One exception to this – Strenger's Resource Man (2014) – draws
from the tech sector's design community. We have complemented it
with the Indiﬀerent Consumer, which our research ﬁnds to be a more
common ﬁgure in the imaginaries of the energy sector incumbents.
dDSR is then being envisaged around two sharply contrasting visions of
user and their role, with opposing levels of ability and willingness to
engage with energy. In this section, we highlight three limitations of
this bifurcated view of dDSR users and the market which will serve
them, (see Table 2 for a summary), before putting forth our own re-
commendations for a more diverse institutional landscape which might
better serve a more diﬀerentiated understanding of users.
6.1. Appealing beyond Resource Man
Introducing Resource Man, Strengers (2014) makes the point that he
is not simply a delusion of technology designers – he exists in the as-
pirations of many users and policy makers, for whom ideas of novel
technology adoption and rational self-optimisation hold great appeal.
Whilst dDSR oﬀers only limited economic sense currently, with the
hoped for electriﬁcation of heating and transport the associated oper-
ating costs will create greater leverage for cost saving legitimations, in
the form of demand response measures such as TOU tariﬀs. Such de-
velopments will further the appeal to Resource Man.
The market then appears well provisioned to recruit Resource Man's
niche for demand response. The niche is just that however. Our concern
is for the majority of users who do not share in this vision. It is telling
that the TOU trials which have shown promising results have been
small scale and – crucially – opt in (see (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010)) for
a meta-analysis. As we argued in previous work (Goulden et al., 2014),
there is a niche amongst end users who will respond to such measures,
and who will self-select for such trials. By contrast, in the few large-
scale trials of TOU tariﬀs in which participation has not required opt-in,
results have been poor (Miller et al., 2017; Torriti, 2012). Engaging a
broader demographic in demand response has yet to be demonstrated.
6.2. The limitations of making dDSR eﬀortless
One alternative response to the niche appeal of dDSR oﬀerings is
also present in several experts’ talk – to render dDSR suﬃciently ef-
fortless that little or no engagement is required by the user, imagined
here as the Indiﬀerent Consumer. Automation is oﬀered as one means of
negating user apathy, another is local storage of heat or electricity.
There is potential here, for example, heat storage oﬀers seemingly easy
opportunities for shifting demand – there is little reason to try and move
showering away from peak morning demand if fed from an oﬀ-peak
heated water tank.
To imagine however, that such technology can be incorporated into
the home without disruption is to render invisible the home as a deﬁned
socio-spatial structure for which some process of accommodation is
required. By way of example, one academic expert spoke of a study
using a pilot deployment of Tesla Powerwall batteries, which were too
large to be installed in a row of British homes, save for on the roof
terraces. This required installing heavy cabling through the middle of
the house, which many householders refused to allow. Another expert
highlighted that many water tanks have been removed from homes, and
the space repurposed for general storage. Such mundane practical
troubles are precisely the kind that dissuade the adoption of new
technologies. Studies of trials where such technologies are deployed
show that occupants are liable to resist service operators attempts to
control practices in unexpected ways (Hansen and Hauge, 2017).
“Calm” technology design (Weiser and Brown, 1996) which seeks to be
invisible in everyday life may well be an eﬀective approach for reaching
many potential dDSR users, but the home presents very real constraints
on what can be achieved with such an approach. Some level of dis-
ruption is seemingly inevitable, and the need to think about the user,
and how they can be engaged, remains.
6.3. Market-fostered rebound eﬀects
Above we report experts’ suggestions that end user engagement will
be driven by consumerism – the adoption of smart home technologies
for which dDSR is an afterthought. We also saw how market ‘innova-
tions’ to the challenge of low-cost demand response took the form of
dirty diesel generation, a development which wrong-footed policy
makers. This highlights the potential for unintended consequences,
where in aiming to promote energy engagement and conservation,
users are directed towards the adoption of new services and technolo-
gies which foster practices with greater energy consumption proﬁles.
This aligns with Nyborg and Ropke's (2011) concerns about the po-
tential for smart home technologies to normalise ‘new expectations to
comfort, convenience, entertainment, security, health care and so on’
(p.1858).
Targeting technologies at comfort and convenience is an obvious
route for industry seeking to expand the adoption of dDSR beyond
Resource Man. We fear current arrangements are a recipe for creating a
‘diesel moment’ in dDSR, but one far more obdurate to shifting once it's
established, due to the raised expectations it will generate amongst
6 Economy 7 is a diﬀerential tariﬀ introduced into the UK in 1978, which
charges a lower rate for overnight consumption.
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users. In the case of Nest, perhaps the most high proﬁle smart home
dDSR service to date, there is indirect evidence of this already hap-
pening. Pisharoty et al. (2015) study found that users who manually
programmed their thermostats saved 8% more energy than those re-
lying on Nest's ‘smart’, automated service. It should not come as a
surprise that the algorithms governing an expensive lifestyle product
favour the risk of wasting energy over the risk of leaving users un-
comfortable. Conﬂicts between the sustainability goals of dDSR, and the
unsustainability of many values fed by consumerism, are signiﬁcant.
6.4. Sourcing alternative user visions
In Section 2 we discuss the UK's current Community Energy Strategy
(DECC, 2014), which seeks to embed community energy in future
policy making (p.16), and yet with the exception of the devolved
Governments of Wales and Scotland, we found little sense amongst
those we interviewed that this was being applied to DSR. On the con-
trary, there was an explicit expectation that the market would push DSR
forwards. This leaves a gap in policy support for mechanisms that can
generate locally-responsive solutions and build relationships that draw
on sources of trust not available to large industry players (Mumford and
Fig. 1. Example of a market diﬀerentiation vision (CSIRO and Energy Networks Association, 2015, p. 33).
Table 2
Weaknesses identiﬁed in current dDSR adoption process.
Key Theme Illustrative Quote Policy Implication(s)
Most energy consumers are not ‘Resource Man’ ‘I think experience to date has shown that customers aren’t as
interested in energy as perhaps government might hope them to
be in order to drive this change really.’ [LI NJ]
Services and Products relying on extensive user engagement
are only likely to work within a subsection of the population.
‘you can’t push ﬂexibility on to people […] you might just ﬁnd
those options within niches, you’re not going to ﬁnd it blanket
across all.’ [A1]
A greater understanding and diﬀerentiation of energy users is
needed.
Automation has potential for promoting dDSR to
the Indiﬀerent Consumer, but it inevitably
entails some degree of disruption
‘[dDSR] needs to be completely hidden and the end user doesn't
see it, doesn’t interact with it, doesn't know or care anything
about it. It just gets the beneﬁt and they can ignore it. Those kind
of things customers like.’ [LI2]
Automation can bypass the need for some engagement but will
still require users willing to accept some degree of physical
and social disruption to the home – meaning the user still
needs to be considered.
‘ideally speaking you would be installing dedicated heat storage
to make your job easier in moving the heating demand around in
time. The size of people's homes, or the fact that they've had
storage tanks removed and replaced with clothes storage, might
make it diﬃcult to put that storage back in.’ [A2]
Characterising consumers as ‘Indiﬀerent’ could lock out
potential ﬂexibility.
Potential for unintended consequences from
market-driven DSR products
‘[T]here has been a view from some quarters of the industry that
the system requires system architects in charge of it. That's not
where we are – the players involved are all pretty committed to
the market. The thing with the market is that it could overshoot,
it could go oﬀ in unpredictable directions – we’ve seen that with
DSR and the unintended growth of new built diesel generation,
that the market came up with.’ [P1]
There is potential for market solutions to promote new energy
practices which consume more energy.
DSR determined by the market alone will not
maximise DSR potential
‘we fell out big time with [major energy supplier] […]we kept
saying to them, look, you just want stuﬀ out of us, we can
actually really help you because nobody trusts you, interface you
with people over the Green Deal for instance, and we want you to
trial new technology in this area because that's one of the things
we’re about. We want to be at the forefront of getting the
community involved in that. And we had so many meetings with
them which were a complete waste of time in the end. Nothing
was forthcoming. They only wanted to do anything in a way
which worked with their kind of commercial model.’ [TS3]
Trusted organisations and community driven initiatives
provide an alternative route to dDSR uptake, enrolling those
poorly served by market oﬀerings.
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Gray, 2010), and which can invoke moral arguments unavailable to
commercial entities.
Mechanisms include energy advisors who can support such schemes
and share best practice (Hargreaves et al., 2013); energy charities
supporting necessary skills for users with impartial advice (Fischer
et al., 2014); participatory system design (Foster et al., 2012) and co-
management models (Strengers, 2011); social housing schemes, which
have deployed large microgeneration and community heat schemes
(Judson et al., 2015); and community energy schemes. In previous work
(Goulden et al., 2014) we argued for the value of community energy,
using some form of shared local renewable generation. The current
Ynni Ogwen pilot in Bethesda, North Wales, ﬁnanced in part by the
Welsh Assembly, is an example of how such a scheme might work with
dDSR. It links variable local hydro-power generation with local con-
sumption, using a bespoke billing system, information feedback, and
community activities to encourage demand response.
Such approaches are not only useful in surfacing notions of energy
as a ﬁnite resource, rather than a utility simply taken for granted when
ﬂicking a light switch, but also in making possible the harnessing of a
set of morally-rooted meanings – ownership, community, self-reliance,
solidarity, even potentially notions of self-sacriﬁce for a greater good –
which are diﬃcult for private industry to credibly evoke. Used along-
side new technologies, such meanings oﬀer hope for reformulating
energy-using practices where the meaning – e.g. better stewardship of
community resources – aligns with sustainability goals, rather than cuts
against them, as many consumer-targeting meanings do.
6.5. Research synthesis: better serving user diﬀerentiation
How might we better support the development of dDSR? Above we
note the common expectation amongst those interviewed that end user
diﬀerentiation will be a central component of dDSR. We concur, and
suggest that recruiting a broader constituency for dDSR necessarily calls
for a wider range of policy options giving greater support to bottom-up
approaches alongside the eﬀorts of industry, that recognise the nu-
merous alternative ways in which users could be engaged with demand
response. However, this requires moving beyond the bifurcated visions
of industry, via policies which support a more diverse institutional
landscape to serve a more diﬀerentiated understanding of users (see
Fig. 1).
Akrich (1992) describes how designers inscribe their technologies
with particular “scripts”: “like a ﬁlm script, technical objects deﬁne a
framework of action together with the actors and the space in which they are
supposed to act” (p.115). We do not see this process as determinisitic,
instead users and technologies reciprocally co-produce one another
(Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2005). In this process of co-production, the user
imagined by the technology designer nevertheless remains inﬂuential.
For example, in assigning particular roles to technology users, scripting
has a moral dimension, a set of values which are realised in the doing of
the practices the technology is a part of Marres (2012). We have already
discussed some of the values contained in pitching dDSR at Resource
Man – rationality, self-optimisation, technology mastery. Alternative
scripts would be conducive to enrolling others. Markets are promoted as
a catalyst of innovation for meeting the diverse ‘needs’ of consumers,
and yet dDSR is problematic in this sense because the need being re-
sponded to is that of policy makers and grid operators, not house-
holders. This complicates eﬀorts to engage with niches beyond the
‘utility Mini-me’ ﬁgure of Resource Man. A lower carbon grid may ul-
timately be in householders’ interest but this is a ‘social good’ argument
which industries are not well placed to deliver, and our interviews give
little impression that industry or policy makers themselves dissent from
this view.
As we discuss in 6.2 and 6.3, the interviews conducted during this
study suggest that a two-pronged strategy of automation and con-
sumerism will be employed. Our interest here is in what this reveals of
customer diﬀerentiation, that bifurcates between engaged users to be
targeted with one set of scripts, and disengaged users to be targeted with
another. The forms of user in the talk of industry and policy makers,
which we have labelled Resource Man and Indiﬀerent Consumer, risks
mistaking a current diversity of reconﬁgurable energy-using practices as
the ﬁxed characteristics of immutable population archetypes. Our in-
terviews suggest there is a danger that any rejection of Resource Man
will lead to users being identiﬁed as Indiﬀerent Consumers and targeted
as such, with scripts which reinforce disengagement from energy pro-
vision, eﬀectively locking them into a continuation of the passive his-
torical role the consumer has played in the electricity grid. If demand
response is subsequently sourced from such users, it is liable to be
modest, and will represent a missed opportunity. That technologically-
mediated self-optimisation does not dovetail with the majority of
electricity users’ existing practices need not preclude other means of
involving these users in demand response, however. Rather, we propose
a more dynamic, integrative view recognising the ways in which users,
energy practices, and energy discourse are co-constituted through
various forms of interaction and tailored for speciﬁc ends and purposes
according to diﬀerent imperatives for environmental policy interven-
tion (Fiorino, 1990; Wardman, 2008). Adopting this more holistic
perspective would allow for the greater ﬂexibility required to meet the
diﬀerentiated needs of a distributed user base and help to facilitate the
‘opening up’ of user engagement in diﬀerent forms, at diﬀerent times,
and in diﬀerent places (Stirling, 2005).
This belief is underpinned by notions of the Energy Citizen dis-
cussed in Section 2, a ﬁgure oﬀering greater prospect of engagement
than the Indiﬀerent Consumer, and amenable to a set of scripts that are
not provided by designing for Resource Man. However, a dDSR sector in
which policy makers rely on the top-down approaches of the market to
determine what ‘works’ is one which will ﬁnd answers to only the
questions that it asks. No robust evidence base for alternative, bottom-
up approaches will be established because they will not be trialled, at
least not at suﬃcient scales and resource-levels. Without such an evi-
dence base our data suggests policy makers will continue their neglect
of them. Instead, we are liable to see the establishment of solutions
which generate the desired demand-responsiveness amongst only a
subset of users, relying on hopeful asocial technological solutions to
bring eﬀortless dDSR to others, which in the process may also si-
multaneously encourage new or intensiﬁed energy consuming prac-
tices.
6.6. Conclusion
An electricity grid in which technologies are decentralised calls for
reciprocal decentralisation of the social arrangements they are a part of.
At the heart of our appraisal of Demand Side Response lies this concern.
We argue that current institutional arrangements for the provision of
DSR in the UK are insuﬃciently diverse to harness the full potential of
it. From our data we cannot comment on how applicable these ﬁndings
are to other states, but we note that many of the same pressures (e.g.
carbon reduction) and stakeholders (most noteably, the tech sector
promoting the smart home) are cross-national features of DSR devel-
opment. This, combined with the UK's status as an early mover in this
area, means that the UK provides a valuable point of comparison.
Whilst non-domestic DSR appears in good health, domestic DSR's
status is of greater concern. Current policy at Westminster is to oversee
the rollout of smart meters, but to leave development of dDSR to in-
dustry. This approach concurs with the pro-market stance of the current
Government, though we also heard from experts interviewed that dDSR
support is made more diﬃcult by a current shortage of data that would
allow policy makers to model its eﬀectiveness. The market – which
marks the entrance of the Silicon Valley tech giants into the energy
sector – is being tasked with ﬁlling this evidence gap. Our data provides
some of the ﬁrst empirical evidence of how diﬀerent stakeholders view
DSR users and expect them to engage with technology. We demonstrate
how the market is focusing on two notions of end user: as Indiﬀerent
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Consumer enrolled through the automation of their home, or as
Resource Man acting as an automaton, and call for a more diﬀer-
entiated view of ‘the user’ (see Fig. 2). Our contention is that leaving
dDSR to the market alone will result in a skewed evidence base that
fails to maximise the chances of dDSR being successful, beyond those
niches the industry is equipped to recruit. We highlight the danger that
the scripting of these technologies will ultimately bifurcate domestic
users into active (‘Resource Man’) and passive (‘Indiﬀerent Consumer’)
roles, the latter of which is likely to become a self-fulﬁlling prophecy –
one which holds only limited opportunities for improving the sustain-
ability of the grid.
We conclude the current approach to dDSR in the UK will have some
success, but many missed opportunities. Against such an outcome we
must set the scale of the task. Climate change is currently proceeding at
the upper levels of predictions, global carbon emissions continue to
grow, and there are fears that the UK will miss its 2030 emissions
targets (e.g. (Energy Institute, 2017)). In light of this, we ﬁnd it hard
not to sympathise with the words of one expert, critical of current
emissions reduction eﬀorts:
in terms of policy making with respect to climate change – on the one
hand we’re saying we need to be making dramatic changes in our energy
consumption, which implies dramatic changes in how we live our lives.
Yet the other rhetoric about this is not a sledge hammer to crack a nut, it's
the exact reverse, it's taking a very mini hammer to a giant boulder to see
if you can make any impact. [I]t's almost a way of kidding yourself that
you’re going to be able to do something. [A1]
We end with a call to rediscover the ambitions of the Energy Citizen
role, which could compliment Resource Man as a user amenable to a
diﬀerent set of scripts. The industry is able to foster the latter because
Resource Man already performs a set of practices involving adopting,
monitoring and responding to data-driven technologies. Industry lacks
the necessarily mechanisms to engage neophytes with dDSR however.
We need instead mechanisms to support bottom-up, ﬂexible arrange-
ments, which can complement the top-down approach of industry. The
Government's commitment to such approaches in the Community
Energy Strategy (2014) is welcome, but our interviews gave no reason
to believe that this is being applied to dDSR, despite the opportunities
for synthesis. If greater involvement in dDSR is to be achieved, then a
mixed strategy, which includes locally-appropriate solutions, oﬀers a
broader set of engagements for enrolling participation.
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